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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WALTER JO&\SOi\,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 14647

RAMONA MERRITT JOHL\SOI\ ,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF

OF

R E S P O ^ D E w T

STATEMENT OF THE MATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the appellant against the
respondent on an Order to Show Cause.
DISPOSITION Ii* LOWER COURT
The Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge, denied appellant's
claim for relief and dismissed the Order to Show Cause.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks to have the order denying tne
defendant's claim for relief on tne Order to Show Cause affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The plaintiff-husband and defendant-wife, were

married in Missoula, Montana, on August 19, 1948.
2.

On November 15, 1974, the plaintiff-husband filed a

Complaint in the District Court, County of Davis, State of Utah,
seeking a Decree of Divorce (R-l through 3).
3.

On December 16, 1974, an Amended Complaint was filed

by the plaintiff-husband.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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4.

Pursuant to the Amended Complaint, the Second

Judicial District Court, the Honorable Thornley K. Swan, Judge,
issued an Order to Show Cause, returnable December 31, 1974. I
5.

The defendant filed an answer and counterclaim

in the District Court of Davis County, State of Utah on December 30,
1974, wherein she listed her income, liabilities, and expenses
(R-10 through 14).
6.

At the request of counsel for the defendant, the

Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge, continued the Order to Show
Cause to January 30, 1975 (R-15).
7.

j

On February 3, 1975, the defendant filed an Order

to Show Cause seeking temporary child support and temporary
alimony until the divorce matter could be heard on its merits.
The Order to Show Cause was signed by the Honorable Thornley K.
Swan, Judge.
8.

The Order to Show Cause which had been signed by

the Honorable Thornley K. Swan, Judge, came before the Second
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge,
presiding, on February 6, 1975. At that time, Judge Hyde ordered
the defendant to tear up the Power of Attorney, which the wife
had had for many years, and required the plaintiff to make the
house payment and utilities on a temporary basis. Furthermore,
Judge Hyde noted that the plaintiff had agreed to pay $200.00 per
month support plus the outstanding obligations of the parties herein.
9.

The order on the Order to Show Cause, referred to

above, was signed by the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, on February 20,
1975.
10.

On March 25, 1975, the defendant filed a motion
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to Compel Discovery in the District Court of the Second
Judicial District (R-29).
11.

The defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery came

before the District Court, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist,
Judge, presiding on April 1, 1975. The Court ordered copies of
the document to be given defendant's attorney (R-31).
12.

A pre-trial order was issued by the Honorable

Thomley K. Swan, Judge, setting the case for a non-jury trial
on the 16th day of May, 1975 (R-51).
13.

A dispute arose between the parties pertaining to

the temporary order issued by the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde on
February 6, over the amount that the plaintiff was to pay towards
the utilities used by the defendant (R-55).
14.

On May 23, 1975, the Honorable Thomley K. Swan

issued the Order to Show Cause in re contempt wherein the
plaintiff was ordered to appear before the Second Judicial District,
in and for Davis County, on the 3rd day of June, 1975.
15.

On June 3, 1975, upon stipulation of counsel for

the parties, the Order to Show Cause was continued by the Honorable
Thomley K. Swan, Judge, to June 10, 1975.
16.

On June 10, 1975, the matter came before the

District Court of the Second Judicial District, County of Davis,
for the hearing on the Order to Show Cause. The Honorable
John F. Wahlquist, interpreting Judge Hyde's Order on the Order
to Show Cause, ordered that the plaintiff was required to pay
only $35.00 per month on the utilities until further ordered
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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by the court (R-60).
17.

On June 17, 1975, the defendant filed an affidavit

seeking $256.14 for alleged deficiencies in plaintiff's payments
to her pursuant to the February 6, 1975, temporary order.
18.

On June 18, 1975, the District Court of the Second

Judicial District, the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge, presiding,
issued the Order to Show Cause to the plaintiff ordering him to
show cause on the 27th day of June, 1975, at the commencement
of trial, why he should not be required to pay to the defendant
the sum of $256.14.
19.

Trial in the divorce proceeding was held on June 27,

1975, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, the
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge, presiding.

In the affidavit

of income, assets, and liabilities, dated June 27, 1975, the
defendant included, for the first time, liabilities of $275.00
to Dr. Steven Morgan, dentist; and $250.00 to Franca Dunham.
These liabilities had not been listed in the schedule filed
December 30, 1974 (R-14).
20.

A memorandum decision was issued by the Second

Judicial District Court, County of Davis, the Honorable Ronald 0.
Hyde, Judge, presiding,

on June 30, 1975. The Court granted the

defendant a divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty on her
counterclaim.

The care, custody and control of the minor child

was granted to the defendant subject to reasonable rights of
visitation in plaintiff.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay the

sum of $100.00 per month for tne support of the minor child until
Digitized
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ordered to pay the sum of $200.00 per month alimony to the
defendant.

The defendant was awarded the house and real

property in Layton, subject to the mortgage thereon, together
with the household furniture and fixtures therein.

The plaintiff

was awarded the mobile home in Kaysville, subject to the mortgage
thereon.

The plaintiff was also awarded a Vista Liner Camper

and pickup truck, a 1969 Ford Galaxie, which was inoperable,
and a 1967 Mustang, which also Was inoperable.
was awarded a 1960 Opal.

The defendant

The contract interest which the parties

had in property located in Kaysville was awarded to the defendant.
The plaintiff was awarded the New York Life Insurance policy, his
own county insurance and retirement, whatever savings he had in
the Credit Union, his fishing gear, antique barbed wire collection, and his tools.

The defendant was awarded stock which had

a purchase value of $100.00.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay

all of the outstanding obligations of the parties excepting the
mortgage on the house awarded to the defendant.

The utility

bills that had been in dispute since the hearing on the Order to
Show Cause were to be paid by the plaintiff.

Judge Hyde also

awarded $400.00 i n attorney's fees to the defendant and ordered
defendant's attorney to draw Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Decree in accordance with the memorandum.
21.

On July 11, 1975, attorney for plaintiff wrote

Judge Hyde pointing out that the award of the attorney's fees
appeared to have been made in error since no testimony was presented
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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nor request was made for attorney's fees.

Further, Mrs.

Johnson had insurance to cover her attorney's fees and her attorney, Mr. Barnes, had, in fact, received $325.00 from the insurance
company for the initial filing of the action.

Judge Hyde res-

ponded on July 17, 1975, amending the Decree to delete the award
of the attorney's fees.
22.

On January 27, 1976, the defendant filed an

Affidavit for an Order to Show Cause in re contempt in which she
alleged that the plaintiff had failed to pay certain outstanding
debts.

The Honorable John H. Wahlquist, Judge, ordered the

plaintiff to appear before the District Court of Davis County on
March 4, 1976, to show cause why he should not be judged guilty
of contempt of court and punished accordingly for willfully
disobeying the Order made on the 12th day of September, 1975.
23.

The plaintiff filed an Affidavit in answer to

the Order to Show Cause on February 24, 1976.

In the Affidavit,

the plaintiff swore upon his oath that he had paid the property
tax on the family home for the year 1974; that he had paid the
utility debts alleged to be unpaid in the Order to Show Cause;
that he would, in fact, pay all outstanding obligations incurred
prior to the filing of the Complaint in the divorce action;
that he had, in good faith, paid all of the obligations and bills
which had been incurred prior to the filing of

the Complaint.

Further, the plaintiff stated under oath that when he went to
pick up the camper and truck, which had been granted him in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the Decree of Divorce, sugar had been dumped in the gas tank
of the truck and the gas and water lines had been ripped from
the camper.

Further, the plaintiff asserted that the burden of

alimony posed an undue hardship on him, that his wife was a fit
and proper person to work, and that a limit on alimony should
be imposed in this case so that he could get remarried and enjoy
a fruitful life.
24.

The defendant's Order to Show Cause came before

the District Court of the Second Judicial District, in and
for the County of Davis, State of Utah, on March 18, 1976. At
that time, the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge, was presiding.

The

defendant, plaintiff, Lynn Madsen, Clinton Hansen, and David Ray
Johnson, were sworn and testified.

The Court denied the request

of the plaintiff for a reduction in alimony, and took the remaining matters under advisement.
25.

On March 19, 1976, the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge,

issued a memorandum decision wherein he stated, referring to the
defendant's claims of debt:
ff

I find the defendant's credibility to be seriously
questioned and I elect not to believe her testimony.
The other aspect of tne case is that she further
tests my credibility to ask me to believe that she
has no knowledge nor hand in the events in the
damage to the truck and camper.. The whole picture
is one of post-divorce efforts to harrass the
plaintiff-husband on every item that can be
conceived by the defendant. The circumstances
surrounding the truck and camper compel me to
deny any relief to the defendant based on equitable
clean hands doctrine. The Order to Show Cause is to
be dismissed (R-95)."
26.
From
that
ruling,
defendant
appealed.
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ARGUMENT
PQIi*T I
JUDGE GOULD WAS r*OT ACTING AS Ax\ APPELLATE JUDGE
WHEi* HE PRESIDED AT THE HEARING Oft DEFENDANT'S
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE Ax\D DECLARATION I* RE CONTEMPT
The District Court has original jurisdiction in all
matters civil and criminal, except those specifically excepted
in the Utah Constitution or prohibited by law.

The District Court,

or any judges thereof, shall have power to issue the writs necessary
to carry into effect their orders, judgments and decrees,
Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 8, UCA 78-3-4.

Utah

Proceedings in

divorce are to be commended and conducted in the manner provided
by law for proceedings in civil cases.

UCA 30-3-1.

Pursuant

to the above mentioned statutory provisions, a complaint seeking
divorce was filed by the plaintiff on November 15, 1974, U* the
Second Judicial District Court, County of Davis, State of Utah.
During the course of the proceedings, as set forth in the statement of facts, many of the justices of the Second Judicial District
Court, were called upon to hear Orders to Show Cause and to make
preliminary rulings.

Justices Swan, Hyde, Wahlquist, and Gould

participated in the proceedings prior to the divorce decree
being issued.

Despite the participation of the justices,

however, the cause of action was always proceeding in the Second
Judicial District Court.

Rule 40 (a), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, explains the procedure for placing cause of action
upon the trial calendar.

It states:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-8-

"The District Court shall provide by rule for the
placing of the actions upon the trial calendar
(1) without request of the parties or (2) upon
request of a party and notice to the other parties
or (3) in such other manner as the Court may
deem expediant. Precedents shall be given to
actions entitled thereto by statute."
Rule 6, Court Rules of tne Second District Court states:
"A. The court administrator shall make assignments
of cases and motions and recommend judge assignments
to provide, as far as practical, that: (l) responsibility
shall be equally borne by all individual judges,
reporters, and clerks; (2) all types of litigation
shall be handled in substantially equal proportions
by individual judges, reporters and clerks, except
special probate clerks. (3) In the court administrator's
discretion, the health and well being of the individual
judge, reporter, and other court personnel is
promoted; but all requests for special scheduling
or changes in assignments for personal reasons,
health, or otherwise, shall be made known to the
judges at the next general meeting.
B. The court administrator may request the reassignment
of a judge, reporter, or clerk at any time if the object
of the change is to effect any of the above goals.
Pursuant to the above mentioned statutory provisions, the various
motions of the divorce proceeding were placed upon the Law and
Motion Calendar.

The motions were then heard and determined by

the justices presiding on that date.

No objection was raised

concerning the jurisdiction of the court nor was objections raised
as to the power of the justices to hear the motion.

The defendant,

appellant herein, does not question the validity of the orders
issued preliminarily, but seeks to attack the post judgment
ruling by Judge Gould.

The basic theory upon which such an attack

is predicated appears to be that the Second Judicial District
Court, Judge Gould presiding, by failing to find the plaintiff
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in contempt was, in effect, not "enforcing" the Decree issued
by the Second Judicial District, Judge Ronald 0. Hyde, presiding.
This position is clearly untenable.
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 30-3-5 states:
"When a Decree of Divorce is made, the court may make
such orders in relation to the children, property,
and parties, and the maintenance of the parties and
children as may be equitable. The Court snail have
continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes
or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance
or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable
and necessary. Visitation rights of parents, grandparents and other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare of the child."
The Court, not the individual judge presiding in a particular
divorce case, has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance
or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and
necessary.

Pursuant to the statutory provisions of U.C.A. 30-3-5,

the defendant filed the order to show cause and declaration
in re contempt.

The cause of action was placed on the Law and

Motion Calendar and assigned to the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge.
The Utah Supreme Court in In re Estate of Mecham, 537 P.2d 312
(Utah 1975), a case cited with approval by appellant, recognized
that when a motion is placed on the Law and Motion Calendar, any
judge of the court handling the calendar has jurisdiction to act
upon the motion.

In Mecham, the heirs of the estate filed a

petition for an Order to Show Cause why the administrator snould
not file his accounting.

After various hearing and proceedings,

the administrator filed such an accounting and petition for distribution Digitized
and bydischarge.
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Judge Joseph G. Jeppson.

Judge Jeppson ordered that the final

account be denied but allowed the petitioner to amend.

A month

later the administrator filed a supplement to his accounting and
mailed a copy to the counsel for the objecting heirs.

Later, the

administrator went to Judge Jeppson and obtained an ex parte
order approving the account and granting the petition for a
distribution and discharge.

The objecting heirs filed a timely

objection attacking the accounting and requested that the matter
be set for trial.

Subsequently, the administrator served and

filed a motion to strike tiie objections and inserted a notice
that the matter would be heard witnin the next few days.

Counsel

for the objecting heirs asserted that he was unaware of tne hearing
and consequently was not present at the hearing.
to vacate xhe order.

He filed a motion

Altnough the motion would ordinarily have

been presented to Judge Jeppson, Judge Jeppson told the counsel
for the objecting heirs that tne motion should be placed on the
Law and Motion calendar.

Tne Utah Supreme Court, reviewing the

above mentioned situation, stated:
"Under such circumstances there is no question but that
any other judge of the court handling the Law and Motion
calendar, including Judge Taylor, would have nad
jurisdiction to act upon the motion, nor that any
action taken thereon if deemed proper, would be
subject to attack to have it corrected by a proper
motion, and/or by an appeal. 537 P.2d 312-313.
The Utah Supreme Court went on to hold that Judge Stewart Hansen's
ruling dismissing the order of Judge Taylor, because Judge Hansen
believed that it purported to overrule the previous order of Judge
the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"We have no doubt about the rule, applicable under
proper circumstances, that a judge of one division
of the same court cannot act as an appellate court
and overrule another such judge, but that rule does
not apply to the order of Judge Taylor in this case."
As delineated above, the objectors timely and properly invoked
the jurisdiction of the court in filing their motion against the
ex parte order of October 19, 1972, approving the accounting.
While in normal procedure and protocol, this motion would have
come up before Judge Jeppson, when he directed that it be placed
on the general Law and Motion Calendar, any judge of the court
had jurisdiction to act in the matter.

When Judge Taylor did

so, and his order was not changed or appealed from, it became
the effective order in the case.

537 P.2d 312, 314.

In the case at bar, a similar fact situation is present.
Judge Hyde issued the original divorce decree.

When the defendant

invoked the jurisdiction of the court in her Order to Show Cause
and Declaration in re contempt, the motion was placed on the
general Law and Motions Calendar.

Pursuant to the language of

the Mecham case, any judge of tne court, including Judge Gould,
handling the Law and Motion Calendar, would have had jurisdiction
to act upon the motion.

Exercising such jurisdiction was a proper

exercise of the power and authority vested in Judge Gould by
virtue of his position as a District Court Judge in the Second
Judicial District Court.
As mentioned above, U.C.A. Sec. 30-3-5 provides:
"When a Decree of Divorce is made, the court may make
such orders in relation to the children, property,
and parties, and the maintenance of the parties
and children as may be equitable. The court
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the
support and maintenance of the parties, the custody
of the children and their support and maintenance,
or the distribution of the property as shall be
reasonable and necessary. Parents, grandparents
and other relations shall take into consideration
the welfare 01 the child. (Emphasis added).
Although the court retains continuous jurisdiction over the
matter, the action in re contempt is separate and apart from the
principal action.

Robinson v. City Court for City of Ogden,

112 Utah 36, 185 P.2d 256 (1949); Bott v. Bott, 20 U.2d 329, 437
P.2d 684 (1968).

When an action in re contempt is instituted in

civil contempt proceedings dealing with failure of a divorced
spouse to honor the divorce decree, the jurisdiction of tne
original divorce action over tne parties and issues is relied
upon*

However, the contempt action is placed on the general Law

and Motion calendar.

In Holbrook v. Holbrook, 117 Utah 114,

208 P.2d 1113, (1949) a divorce was granted to the wife on May 3,
1948, by the Second Judicial District Court, the Honorable
Charles G. Cowley, presiding.

In a subsequent contempt hearing

the Honorable A. H. Ellett, temporarily sitting in the Second
Judicial District, presided.

Although Judge Cowley had issued

tne original divorce decree, tne Utah Supreme Court upheld the
contempt decree conviction issued by Judge Ellett.
The necessity of allowing a second judge to preside over
contempt nearings is based upon strong public policy.

Often

times a contempt proceeding for alleged failure to abide by a
divorce decree may be instituted several years after the
original divorce
decree. In Andersen v. Baker, 5 U.2d 33, 296
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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after the divorce, the husband was found in contempt of the
1949 divorce decree.

In dicta, the Utah Supreme Court stated:

"The fact that the court below had jurisdiction over
the parties and jurisdiction to interpret the
stipulation and original decree must be recognized.
Any error that may be present does not concern
lack of jurisdiction. 296 P.2d 283, 285.
In Petersen v. Petersen, 530 P2d 821 (Utah, 1974), the parties
obtained a Decree of Divorce in May, 1955.

In August, 1965,

an Order to Show Cause was issued against the wife alleging
failure to comply with the visitation rights of the 1955 Decree.
The Honorable Merrill C. Faux executed an order holding Mrs.
Petersen in contempt and suspended the payment of support money
until such time as Mrs. Petersen appeared before the Court in
person and purged herself of contempt.

Nine and a half years

later, Mrs. Petersen moved for an Order to Show Cause why Mr.
Petersen should not have to pay an amount equal to the suspended
support payments.

Third District Court Judge Peter Leary, held

that Judge Faux's August, 1965 contempt order was vacated.

The

Utan Supreme Court, however, held that Judge Leary!s ruling
which vacated the 1965 contempt order was in error and sustained
Faux's order.

Again, this fact situation is very similar to the

case at bar, although Judge Hyde presided at the divorce trial,
Judge Gould presided at the contempt hearing.

As in the case of

Judge Faux^ Judge Gould had the necessary statutory power and
authority to preside at that hearing.

When he made nis decision,

that decision was not capable of review by another judge in the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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District Court.

Judge Gould was not reviewing nor modifying the

Divorce Decree issued by Judge Hyde, but rather was presiding
in an independent action to determine whether the plaintiff was
to be found in contempt.
In the case at bar, Judge Gould was not acting as an
appellate judge.

The contempt proceedings was a separate action

from the divorce action.

Although the actions were related,

having the same parties and concerning some of the same properties,
the actions were independent.

When the defendant filed the Order

to Show Cause and declaration in re contempt, it was placed
on the general Law and Motion Calendar.

Judge Gould, assigned

to sit at the Law and Motion hearings, properly heard the motion
and evidence thereto.

No objection was made by the defendant

until after Judge Gould had ruled adversely to her.

The grounds

for which she argues for objecting to his presiding are clearly
untenable.

The Utah Supreme Court has long held that a contempt

proceeding need not be presided over by the Judge who issued the
original divorce decree.
POINT II
JUDGE GOULD PROPERLY RULED THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS
i\OT Ii\ CONTEMPT OF COURT BASED 0i\ THE EQUITABLE
CLEAi\ HA^DS DOCTRINE.
Judge Gould, i** the Order on the Order to Show Cause ruled
that:
"It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the
defendant's credibility is seriously questioned by
the Court, and the Court did not elect to believe the
defendant's testimony as to her knowledge of any
alleged damage to the truck and trailer, and that
the wnole picture is one of post divorce efforts
to harass the plaintiff husband on every item
that
can
be W.conceived
byClark
the
defendant,
and
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based on the equitable clean hands doctrine. The
Order to Show Cause is hereby dismissed. (R-95, 96)
The "clean hands" doctrine has long been recognized in Utah law.
In Baker v. Baker, 224 P.2d 192 (1950), the court discussed this

doctrine.

It said:
"It is a general rule that a party that is in contempt
will not be heard by the court wnen he wishes to make
a motion or grant a favor, and if a party files a
pleading w^ile in contempt, it will be stricken from
the file on motion (citations omitted). In Cole v.
Cole, 142 111. 19, 31 N.E. 109, 111, 19 L.R.A. 811,
where a former husbaud was in arrears in his payments
for alimony petitioned the court for modification of
the decree in order to have the alimony payments
reduced, the court denied his petition saying, "He
is not coming to the court with clean hands and will
not be permitted to ask relief from a decree from which
he is in contempt. Before he should be permitted to
be heard, he should be required to comply witn the
order of the court up to the time of his application."
224 P.2d 192, 194.

In Petersen v. Petersen supra, the Utah Supreme Court also discussed
the "clean hands" doctrine.

The Court said:

"There is no question that Mrs. Petersen was in contempt
of court, after having been in such straits for 9 1/2
years when she applied for the support money judgment
without having purged herself of the contempt. That
requirement was a condition precedent to outaining the
support money, ie, the exercise of Mr. Petersen's right
to see his children. Mrs. Petersen had not permitted
this, which became the basis of her contempt. In short,
she had not done and is not doing equity the while
she insists on it, by now seeking, without any displayed
penitence, remorse or strings attached, invoked the
very jurisdiction of the court that she flouted before.
She was in no conscionable position to do so, and tne
court need not have entertained her petition. To coin
a paraphrased maxim of equity and reduce it to Pidgeon
English, "One may not make a monkey out of the court",
without cause, that is. 530 P.2d 821, 822.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff went to get the truck and camper
which had been awarded him pursuant to the original divorce
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decree.

When he arrived, he found that sugar had been dumped

in the gas tank, and that other damage had been done to the
truck and camper.

Judge Gould, after a review of tne evidence,

and testimony given by the parties and other persons concluded
that he chose not to believe the defendant's testimony that she
had no knowledge to the alleged damage to the truck and camper.
Judge Gould found that "The whole picture is one of post divorce
efforts to harass the plaintiff on every item that can be
conceived of by the defendant.11
court with "unclean hands".

The defendant came into the

In such straits, she was not in

a position to ask the court to do equity while she had not done
equity.

It was well within Judge Gould's discretion to refuse to

require the plaintiff to pay the disputed debts.
CONCLUSION
The decree issued by the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde,
Judge, granting a divorce to the defendant on her counterclaim,
and awarding certain property to the parties, as well as care,
custody, and control of tne minor child, is to be given its full
force and effect.

When the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge, pre-

sided in the Order to Show Cause and declaration in re contempt
hearing, he was not acting as an appellate judge to review or
modify the divorce issued by Judge Hyde.

He was presiding over

the motion which had been delegated to him by way of the general
law and motion calendar.

After a review of tne evidence and

testimony of the parties and others, he correctly held that the
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plaintiff was not in contempt of the court and, because of the
damage to the truck and camper, would not require the plaintiff
to pay the disputed claims.

These rulings were certainly within

the power, authority and discretion or the Honorable Calvin
Gould, Judge.
Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN C. VAl\DERLIi*DE*\
137 East State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Attorney for Respondent

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
A copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent was
posted in the U. S. mail, postage prepaid, and addressed
to the Attorney for the Appellant, Pete N. Vlahos, Legal
Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, on
this

da,y of October, 1976.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

